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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
As a result of a trial held January 19, and 21, 1988,
before the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, Seventh District Court
Judge, Neal F.

Bake, Appellant, has requested this Court to

review the following issues:
1. The trial court failed to make any threshold determination of substantial change in circumstances since entry of
the Decree of Divorce on the issue of custody, before modifying
that decree which is a misapplication of the law.
2. The order modifying the parties' Decree of Divorce
which changed custody of the parties' two minor children from
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Neal F. Bake to Vickey L. Bake, was an abuse of discretion by the
trial judge.
3. The evidence offered at trial regarding custody does
not support the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order that it is in the best interests of the children
that custody be changed from Neal Bake to Vickey Bake.
4. The trial judge failed to properly apply the law to
the facts in determining the best interests of the children in
modifying the custody award herein.
5. The trial court improperly limited the presentation
of Defendant's case by proceeding to trial without allowing the
custody evaluation which had been ordered to be performed; by
interviewing the children in chambers without making a record of
that interview and making findings thereon; and by prohibiting
any testimony at trial concerning Vickey Bake's caretaking of the
parties1 nephew Steven Springer.
6. The trial court failed to make sufficient findings on
which to base its Order modifying custody from Neal Bake to
Vickey Bake.
7. The trial court's award of child support to Vickey
Bake was an abuse of discretion on the facts as presented.
STATUTES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION
The following statutes require interpretation:
1. Section 30-35-5, Utah Code Annotated (1984, as
amended), copy attached.
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2. Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated (1984,
amended), copy attached.
3. Section 78-45-7, Utah Code Annotated (1984, as
amended), copy attached.
STATEMENT ON THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The parties herein were divorced by order of the Seventh
Judicial District Court for Duchesne County, State of Utah, on
August 19, 1985, by order of the Honorable Richard C. Davidson.
The Decree of Divorce awarded the Appellant Neal F. Bake custody
of the parties1 two minor children, Kyle Bake and Nathan Bake,
who were ages 10 and 8 at the time of the divorce. (Decree of
Divorce, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the
Stipulation are attached hereto as Exhibit A ) .
The Decree of Divorce did not address the custody of the
parties1 foster child and nephew, Steven Springer, age 12 at the
time of the divorce, who resided with Vickey Bake after the
divorce.

Because the Respondent denied Neal Bake access and

visitation with his nephew Steven, and took the child out-ofstate for an extended period without informing him, he filed a
Verified Petition for Modification of the Divorce Decree in
January 1987, seeking custody of Steven Springer.

(Record,

58-62, hereafter "R.58-62"). The Respondent filed a
Counterpetition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce
requesting custody of the parties1 two minor children.
On May 18, 1987, a hearing was held before Domestic
Relations Commission Howard Maetani on the petition of Neal F.
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Bake for custody of Steven Springer. The Commissioner
acknowledged that joint guardianship of the boy had been previously

granted by the Juvenile Court, and granted visitation to

Appellant Neal Bake and ordered that Vickey Bake would continue
to have physical custody of the child.

The Court further ordered

the parties to have a home study done by an independant child
custody evaluator to determine what would be in the best
interests of the parties' two natural children as regards a
change of custody. (Ex. B hereto, Recommendation and Order
5-18-87.)
On November 5, 1987, attorney for Respondent requested
a hearing on the Counterpetition for Modification concerning the
parties1 two natural children. No custody evaluation had been
performed.

Counsel for Neal Bake filed an objection to

Plaintiff's request for hearing on or about January 13, 1988,
which was denied by the Court. (R.115-118) A trial was held
January 19, and 21, 1988, on the Counterpetition for Modification
of the Decree of Divorce concerning custody of the parties' two
natural children.
On January 26, 1988, Judge Dennis L. Draney issued a
ruling changing custody of the two minor children from Neal Bake
to Respondent. (Ruling attached hereto as Exhibit C.)
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order modifying the
Decree of Divorce were signed by the Court on February 18, 1988.
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Modification
are attached hereto as Exhibit D.)
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On February 8, 1988, Defendant filed a Motion to have
the Court Reopen Judgment and Direct Entry of a New Judgment and
for a Stay of Proceedings to enforce judgment. (R. 126-129, copy
attached as Exhibit E.) This Motion was denied without hearing by
Judge Draney on February 26, 1988. (R. 147).
The minor children Nathan and Kyle Bake were in the care
and custody of Neal Bake from early summer of 1985 until the
Court ordered a change of custody at the end of February, 1988.
At the time of the modification trial the children were ages 11
and 13.
Judge Dennis L. Draney ordered a custody modification
based on the following Findings of Fact:
3. The Plaintiff lives in a doublewide mobile home with
her husband, his daughter Rachel, age 5 and Plaintiff's nephew,
Steven, age 14. The home is located in the business district of
Roosevelt, Utah, on the same lot, somewhat removed from a
building containing a cafe and a lounge. The home is adequate in
size and upkeep for it's present occupants and for the boys which
are the subject of this action.
4. The Defendant lives in Sandy, Utah, with his parents
in a residential area of the City. The home is adequate in size
and upkeep for its present occupants including the boys.
5. Plaintiff is employed as a waitress at the lounge
near her home, and works from 8:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.. While she
is working, Steven cares for Rachel, and there was no evidence
that the arrangement has not worked satisfactorily. Plaintiff
would be with the boys virtually every day.
6. Defendant works as a long haul truck driver, and is
away from home the majority of the time. While he is away his
mother cares for the boys.
7. Both of the parties have a deep concern for the boys,
and have the ability to care for their needs.
8. The boys have expressed a strong desire to live with
the Plaintiff, stating that they want to be with her and with
-8-

their cousin Steven, and that they enjoy school more in
Roosevelt, and that their friends are in Roosevelt.
9. A very favorable picture of Defendant's home and care
for the boys is presented by the testimony of the Defendant and
his mother. However, the validity of their testimony is adversely
affected by significant discrepancy in the evidence presented by
them.
10. It was the uncontroverted testimony of the Plaintiff
that the Defendant recently said to her f,You better get your
boys back." (R. pp. 148-150).
On the issue of child support the Court found that
Vickey Bake earned $1,217.00 per month, and supported her nephew
Steven. The Court found that Neal Bake earned $1,109.24 per
month. (R. p. 148-150).

On these facts the Court ordered Mr.

Bake to pay child support in the sum of $115.00 per month, per
child.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Overview.
After thirteen years of marriage the parties to this
action were divorced on August 19, 1985. The Appellant Neal F.
Bake was awarded custody of the parties' two minor children, Kyle
Kirk Bake (born, 12-17-86) and Nathan Frank Bake (born 10-10-74).
Plaintiff Vickey Bake was awarded liberal visitation including
every weekend, the entire summer and alternating holidays. The
Decree provided that "based on the parties' income and their
agreement Plaintiff should have no obligation to pay child support" and both parties waived any claim to alimony, (R. 43-45;
Exh. A.)
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Neal F. Bake was awarded the care, custody and control
of the minor children with the provision that important decisions
concerning the children, such as medical and schooling, would be
discussed between the parties. (Exhibit A, Decree of Divorce,
para. 2 ) . In its findings, the Court found that Mr. Bake was a
fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody and control
of the minor children and that the children had expressed a
desire to live with him. No findings were made concerning Mrs.
Bake.

The Court also found:
"The parties have agreed that since the award of custody
is based on the desires of the children that in the
event the boys change their mind and express their
desire to return to live with their mother that custody
would be changed awarding custody to the Plaintiff
without a need to show a change of circumstances".
(Exhibit A, Findings of Fact, para. 4.)
B. Facts Relating to Respondent Vickey Bake.

After her separation from Neal Bake in March, 1985,
Respondent moved in with another man, Duane Adderly, whom she
married ten days after her divorce was final in August.
(Transcript, hereinafter

H

tr.'f, 11.) The Adderlys now live in a

doublewide trailer in Roosevelt, Utah, located about 100 feet
behind the lounge where they are both employed, (tr. 11-13.)
Immediately after her divorce in August, 1985, the Respondent
lived in a camping trailer with Mr.

Adderly for about a month,

(tr. 32.) After that, Respondent and Mr. Adderly moved into his
grandfather's mobile home in Cedarview where they lived for about
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one year, (tr. 31.) In July of 1986, the Respondent and Mr.
Adderly moved to Colorado where they stayed about four months,
(tr. 26.) After that, the Respondent and Mr.

Adderly rented a

home in Roosevelt where they lived for approximately six months,
(tr.

29-30).

Since July, 1987, the Adderlys have lived in their

present trailer.

(tr. 29.)

During these five moves in a span of two years, the
Adderlys household consisted of Mr. Adderly1s daughter, Rachel,
age 5, and Steven Springer, the nephew of these parties, who was
age 14. (tr. 11.)
Vickey Bake works as a waitress and occasional bartender
at the "Id Lounge" in Roosevelt, Utah. (tr. 12.) Her husband is
the manager and bartender at the same bar which is located about
100 feet from the Respondent's trailer, (tr. 13.) The
Respondent's hours are from 8:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m. Tuesday
through Saturday and she has also worked since the divorce at a
music store and at Pizza Hut. (tr. 13, 25-26.) The Respondent's
husband, Duane Adderly, works from 4:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m. at
the "Id Lounge".

(tr. 33.)

Respondent testified that there have been fights both
inside and outside of the bar which have required police intervention, (tr. 24, 25.)
Respondent testified that it was Steven, age 14, who
tended the Adderly's daughter, Rachel, age 5, while the Adderlys
were at work. (tr. 13.)
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Respondent testified that she earned $1,217.00 per month
which includes a monthly stipend of $217.00 from the State of
Utah for the support of her nephew Steven. (R. 86-88) The
Respondent also receives food stamps, (tr. 29.)
During visitation the Respondent has had the children
working washing dishes in the restaurant, now closed, which was
part of the "Id Lounge", (tr. 18.)
The Respondent testified that the doublewide trailer had
three bedrooms, one for Steven Springer, one for herself and Mr.
Adderly, and one for their daughter Rachel and that if the
children came to reside with her they would share Steven's room,
(tr. 32.) Respondent testified that it was her practice to rise
in the morning about 9:00 or 10:00 and that Steven typically made
his own breakfast and went to school on his own without supervision, (tr. 33, 34.)
Respondent testified that her husband Mr. Adderly drank
beer on a daily basis and had undergone court ordered alcoholism treatment, (tr. 37, 38.) She further testified that he regularly drank whiskey while he was working, (tr. 37, 38.)
During visitation with the Respondent, Kyle had an
asthma attack and was hospitalized in Roosevelt. When he was
returned to Mr. Bake's custody the Respondent did not inform him
of this episode which he only learned of by accident, (tr. 106.)
Vickey Bake was aware the boys were in counseling and
objected to it, but never contacted the therapist, never
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discussed it with Mr. Bake, and denies the boys had any adjustment problems, (tr. 43, 44.)
When Kyle was hospitaLized for asthma during visitation,
Vickey Bake did not inform Mr. Bake when returning the child concerning the incident or any follow-up care. (tr. 106.)
C. Facts Relating to Vickey Bake's Care of Steven Springer.
During most of the parties' marriage, they were the
joint guardians of a nephew, Steven Springer, (tr. 11.) At the
time of the parties' divorce, the Court did not consider the
custody issue of Steven Springer and no order was made in his
regard. Steven had lived with the family since he was age 5 and
Neal Bake had acted as a parent towards him. (tr. 11, 23.) After
the divorce, Mr. Bake was prevented from seeing Steven or having
access to him. Additionally, the Respondent would not keep Mr.
Bake informed of her whereabouts, she often did not have a phone
and would not facilitate visitation or contact between Steven and
Mr. Bake. (tr. 98, 99). When he did have contact with his nephew,
Mr. Bake had concerns that his needs were not being met as he was
being required to babysit continually for Rachel, he was not properly dressed, and he was not doing well in school.

(tr. 98,

100; Verified Petition for Modification, R. 58-62.) These
problems resulted in Appellant filing a petition for Modification
of the Divorce Decree wherein he sought custody of his nephew
Steven Springer. (R. 58-62.)
Since the parties' divorce, Respondent was the sole
caretaker of her nephew Steven Springer and she received a
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monthly stipend from the State of Utah for his care. (tr. 27.)
While Vickey Bake was the sole caretaker for Steven Springer
there were four referrals for child neglect and her fitness made
to the Division of Social Services in Roosevelt, Utah. (tr.

72.)

Mr. Ralph Draper, the Supervisor of Social Services in Roosevelt
was responsible for investigating these referrals which were made
by different parties, (tr. 67, 68.) The first referral was in
January, 1986, where the complaining party indicated Steven was
not properly clothed for school, had no lunch or lunch money, and
was poorly groomed. Mr.

Draper confirmed these facts which were

verified by the Vice-Principal of Steven's school, Mr.

Mitchell,

(tr. 68.) Another referral stated that Steven Springer was always
tired because he was constantly babysitting, (tr. 70.) Mr. Draper
testified that he contacted Mrs. Adderly concerning these
referrals and did not believe they required removal of the child
from the home. (tr. 71.)

Additionally, there were referrals con-

cerning Mrs. Adderly1s lifestyle, that she was living with a man
she was not married to, that the family was being supported by
Steven Springer's stipend check, and living in adequate housing,
(tr. 74.) During a follow-up visit, Mrs.

Adderly admitted she

had some difficulty with Steven. Mr. Draper also interviewed
Steven himself and testified that he found him to be introverted,
shy, and unassertive,

and "felt that he needed supervision",

(tr. 81, 82.)
The trial court refused to allow Appellant to examine
witnesses on the subject of Vickey Bake's care of Steven Springer
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although counsel argued that her care of Steven was the best and
only evidence of her parenting ability since no custody evaluation had ever been done. (tr. 100).
D.

Facts Relating to Vickey Bake's Visitation.

Concerning visitation, Mrs. Cora Bake, Appellant's
mother, testified that she kept an independent record of every
call, letter, and visit from Vickey Bake to the boys. (tr.
123-125.) She testified that this log was kept in a yearly calendar book and was maintained ever since the boys came to live in
her home. (tr. 123.) In testifying about the contacts between
Vickey Bake and her sons, Mrs. Bake reviewed the calendar of
1987, specifically the months of January through May.

(Trial

Exh. 5.) Mrs. Bake testified that in the month of January, 1987,
there was only one letter from Mrs. Bake. In February, 1987,
there were two phone calls. In March, 1987, there was one call to
arrange a visit which occurred on the 13th. In April there were
no contacts, that is, no calls, letters or visits. In May, 1987,
there was a call and a visit of a few hours on the 20th and a
visit on the 22nd. (tr. 125-127.)
The visit on May 22nd was quite upsetting to Mrs. Bake
as Vickey Bake arrived one hour early then had been arranged and
simply walked in the house, took the children and was leaving in
her car before Mrs. Bake happened to see them by glancing outside. Mrs. Bake testified that if she had not happened to see
them leaving she would have never known they had left the house.
(Tr. 127, 128.)
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Mrs. Bake summarized the contacts in her log during
several months in 1986 as follows. In January one letter was
received from Vickey Bake to the boys; in April there were no
contacts, in September there were no contacts, in November there
was one card received, and in December there was a birthday card
and one letter, (tr. 129-131.) Mrs. Bake testified that she never
denied visitation when it was requested by the Respondent and
that the parties had even agreed to a specific time for telephone
calls so the children would be home if the Respondent happened to
call. (tr.

132.) Lastly, Mrs. Bake testified that the children

never asked to call Vickey Bake nor did they express the desire
to live with her. (tr. 133.)
Mr. Bake testified that Vickey Bake would make visitation arrangements and then not show up which upset the boys (tr.
105) and that there were long lapses between contacts, (tr. 109.)
Also, that contact with Vickey was difficult because she often
had no phone and would not keep him informed of her whereabouts,
(tr. 98, 99.)
Mr. Bake testified he has had to call the police when
the Plaintiff refused to return the children after visitation,
(tr. 109) and that the Respondent was seldom timely for arranged
visitation, that she was often early, late or would not show up
at all. There were even times when she refused to return the
children which resulted in them missing school, (tr. 109, 110.)
Mr. Bake testified that Respondent would miss special occasions
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with the children, such as Christmas, 1986, and birthdays where
there would be no call, letter or contact, (tr. 11.)
Vickey Bake alluded to visitation problems with the
Appellant but never sought legal help and could not remember when
she had called the police except that it occurred "every time" she
went to the Appellant's house, (tr. 40, 41.) However Respondent
did not have police with her when she went to the Appellant's
home May 22, 1987 (tr. 127.) No police reports were introduced by
Respondents.
Vickey Bake's father, Bud Nelson testified at the trial
and stated that until seeing her at trial he had not seen his
daughter for four years, (tr. 139-140.) Although he sent regular
birthday and Christmas cards to his daughter Vickey and his
grandson Steven Springer, he never had any response, (tr. 141.)
Mr. Nelson testified that Vickey Bake never brought her sons or
Steven Springer to visit him even though he was not aware of any
difficulties in their relationship and that she always knew where
he was. (tr. 140, 141.)
In contrast, Mr. Nelson testified that Neal Bake tried
hard to stay in touch with him and would bring his grandsons
Nathan and Kyle as well as Steven Springer, to visit him since
the parties had been divorced, (tr. 141.) Mr. Nelson also
testified that he has had extended visits with his grandsons and
that in his opinion the relationship between Neal and his grandsons was good and that they appeared cared for and happy when
they were with him. (tr.

142, 143.)
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E. Facts Relating to Neal Bake, Appellant.
Mr. Bake testified that he was a truck driver employed
by Uintah Freightways and earned $1,109.00 per month, (tr. 87,
89., R. 90-93) He stated that he had worked for his present
employer three or four months and before that worked for PST
Vans.

He changed companies so that he could be home more with

his sons even though it meant a cut in pay. (tr. 88.) His present
job allowed him to be home on weekends and holidays.

He also

testified that he had been looking for other work which would be
local driving so he could be home on a daily basis, (tr.

88.)

Ever since his separation from the Respondent on about
March 11, 1985, Mr. Bake has resided with his parents at their
home in Sandy, (tr. 89, 90.) There are five bedrooms in the home,
with two bedrooms downstairs and a play room where the boys stay,
a large yard and that, the home is located next to Nathan's
school.

(tr. 90.)
When asked how the original stipulated custody arrange-

ment came about, Mr. Bake testified that Mrs. Bake said she "had
raised kids all of her life, [that she did not want to raise
anymore and,] wanted to start a life of her own", (tr. 96.)
Mr. Bake testified that he spent all of his time off
with his children and that they were seldom apart, (tr. 97.) He
often took them on his driving trips, to visit his friends and
also stated that he actively participated in their school functions and Boy Scouts, (tr. 97, 98.) He testified that the boys

-18-

were involved in music and choir lessons and that Kyle received
excellent grades in school, (tr. 97, 102.) Mr. Bake testified
that his son Nathan had about a C average in school and that he
personally met with his teachers and implemented a structured
study time to help improve his grades, (tr. 102# 103.) Mr.

Bake

further testified that he had concerns about his son's adjustment
to the divorce and thus took his sons to counseling and participated with them in family counseling, (tr.

101.)

Mr. Bake stated that his sons' health was quite good
although Kyle used to suffered from asthma. However, he testified
that since the divorce his son was much better and no longer
needed daily medication for this condition, (tr. 105.) Mr. Bake
noted that Kyle's asthma attacks apparently reasserted themselves
when he was visiting his mother. Since the divorce only a single
episode of asthma arose while Kyle was in Neal's care, and that
occurred because his mother had told him that she would pick them
up for visitation and never showed up. The stress from this episode resulted in a slight attack of asthma, (tr. 105.)
Mr. Bake has noticed that when the children return from
visitation they are much harder to handle and are undisciplined
(tr. 103, 104). He testified that when they visited the
Respondent they were allowed to stay up as late as they wanted
and that they were much harder to control after returning to Salt
Lake. (tr.

104.) Mr. Bake attributed the deteriorations in beha-

viour to alcohol use in Respondent's household, and lack of
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supervision, (tr. 103, 104.) Mr. Bake also noted that the boys
have usually not been fed when he picks them up in the evening
after visitation.

(tr. 105.)

Mr. Bake indicated that he and his mother would closely
supervise the children at home and had definite expectations for
the boy's homework and chores. Mr. Bake testified that one night
a week the boys were expected to do dishes and were also expected
to keep their rooms and play area picked up.

He also testified

that he never denied the children clothes or shoes but tried to
teach them the value of earning money which included that they
contribute to their purchase of shoes, (tr. 112.)
In addition to Mr. Bake, the childrens' daily needs were
also provided for by Cora Bake, the Appellant's mother. Mrs. Bake
testified that she was employed full time as a school lunch
manager where she worked from 7:00 to 2:30 every school day but
was always home before the boys returned from school, (tr. 118,
119.)
She testified that Mr. Bake set the rules in the household and that they would jointly discipline the boys if that was
needed, by exercising a time-out or having them write down and
explain what they did wrong and how it should be handled, (tr.
120, 135.) Mrs. Bake testified that the boys were extremely close
to Neal stating they were "like shadows with him" and that he
called at least every other day and often every day to talk to
the boys when he was on the road (tr. 120, 121.) She testified
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that these phone calls would not be brief rather that they would
have long discussions about what the boys were doing and any
problems that had arisen because communication was important to
the household.

(tr. 120, 121.) Mrs. Bake also testified that

Neal would stay home from work on occasion if his sons were sick,
(tr. 122.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. The trial Court failed to make a determination or
finding of changed circumstances which is an invariable precondition to modification of a Divorce Decree in Utah. Although the
Decree of Divorce waived such ei determination, the law requires
this determination before reopening a custody decree and the
court erred in failing to make such a determination before
issuing an Order modifying custody herein.
II. The findings of the trial court to support modification of the custody order in this case were insufficient, and
showed that the Court failed to follow the legal standards
established in Utah for custody determinations.

Further, these

findings do not set forth a rational basis for changing custody
from Mr. Bake who had been the sole caretaker of the children for
over two years. The findings aLso do not reflect that the "best
interests" of the children were better served by a change of
custody.
III. The Court failed to make adequate findings concerning
the financial circumstances of the parties when making its order
of child support which was an abuse of discretion.
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ARGUMENTS
Introduction
Neal Bake had sole custody and control of his sons
Nathan and Kyle for over two years until Judge Dennis Draney
modified the custody order on grounds that were totally insufficient and contrary to law. At the outset, Judge Draney did not
require the moving party to make a showing of any change of circumstances from the time of the divorce on the custody issue.
Rather, he waived that burden based on the parties' settlement
stipulation as reflected in their Decree of Divorce.
In deciding to change custody, Judge Draney totally
ignored the substantial part of the Defendant's evidence. That
is, he makes no reference and apparently gives no weight to the
fact that Vickey Bake kept in very poor contact with her sons,
during the two years since the divorce where lapses of two or
three months would occur with no phone calls, letters or visits
despite an order permitting weekly visits. Additionally, Judge
Draney makes no reference, and gives no apparent weight, to the
dramatic differences in the households and styles of living between the parties' homes. He makes no mention of the fact that
Plaintiff and her husband work full time in a bar which is 100
feet from where their trailer is and that the children are unsupervised from at least 8:00 at night and often in the mornings.
This situation contrasts with that of the Defendant where the
Defendant's parents are present to assist with child rearing and
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supervision even though the Defendant is often out-of-town during
the weekdays because of work.
Lastly, the Court's ruling was made without the benefit
of a custody evaluation which was previously entered by the
Court. Prior to the trial, the Appellant filed objections and
requested a postponement of the trial so this evaluation could be
done to provide an objective view of the children's best
interests and this was denied by the Court, (tr. 2, 3, 7, 8.)
Additionally, the Court imposed severe limitations on the presentation of Appellant's case by ruling that testimony concerning
Vickey Bake's raising of the minor child in her care, Steven
Springer, was not relevant. Without a custody evaluation, this
ruling deprived the court of the best evidence available to show
the parenting abilities, or lack thereof, of Vickey Bake.
Appellant submits that although the appealable errors
are based primarily upon misapplication of the law to the facts,
the Judge's selective use of the evidence and shallowness of analysis, poses a disturbing question concerning the courts attitude
and bias towards Mr. Bake. In short, it appears that the Court
ruled simply out of a bias in favor of the children being with
their mother rather than on the basis of the "best interest" of
the minor children herein.
I. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE AN INITIAL
DETERMINATION OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO
MODIFYING CUSTODY.
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It is well settled in Utah that before a Divorce Decree
can be modified to change custody, that a showing of substantial
and material change of circumstances must be made by the moving
party. In the absence of such a showing the Utah Supreme Court
has held that a petition to modify custody must be dismissed.
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Ut. 1982); Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d
853 (Ut. 1987).
The Supreme Court elaborated on the modification
threshold standard in the case of Becker v. Becker 694 P.2d 608,
610 (Ut. 1984) where the Court stated:
"The asserted change must ... have some material relationship to and substantial effect on the parenting ability [of the custodial parent] or the functioning of the
presently existing custodial relationship." 694 P.2d
610; accord Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197, 200 (Ut.
1985).
If a Court determines that the threshold change of circumstances has been met on a given issue, then the Court is
required to weigh all of the evidence in determining whether a
changed placement would be in the best interest of the child.
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-10; Williams v. Williams 655 P.2d 652
(Ut. 1982) Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d at 54. Always an important
factor in this analysis is the child's interest in maintaining a
stable long term placement. Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507, at 510
(Ut. 1986).

Basically, once the custody question is reopened the

trial court must consider the changes in circumstance along with
all other relevant evidence and "determinate de novo which
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custody arrangement will serve the welfare or best interest of
the child". Hogge v. Hogge, supra.
Without question, the Court's equitable powers also give
it the authority to overrule the stipulation of the parties and
in this case requires the court to follow legal precedent concerning the burden to show a substantial change of circumstances
prior to a modification of a custody decree.

The trial courts

failure to apply this essential prerequisite in the present case
is clearly erroneous and must be reversed.
The trial court herein should have ignored the stipulation waiving the threshold burden of showing changed circumstances set forth in the decree. There is ample precedent to support
a trial courts authority to set aside or modify a stipulation of
the parties as presented in this case.
In the case of Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707 (Ut.
1985), the Court expressly addressed the judicial power to modify
the stipulation for agreement of the parties in the context of
support awards. Citing Callister v. Callister, the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
"It is therefore reasonable to assume that the law was
intended to give the Courts power to disregard the stipulations or agreement of the parties in the first
instance and enter judgment for such alimony or child
support as appears reasonable, and to thereafter modify
such judgments when a change of circumstances justifies
it, regardless of attempts of the parties to control the
matter by contract."

See also, Nunley v. Nunley, 85 Ut.Adv.Rept. 15 (6/22/88); Clausen
v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562 (Ut. 1983).
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Thus, following proper procedure, a Court would not
reopen a custody question until it had first made a threshold
finding of substantial and material change of circumstances.
This did not occur in the case at bar where the Decree of Divorce
stated that the parties waive the need to show a change of circumstances and states that if the minor children ever express a
desire to live with Respondent Vickey Bake then custody would be
changed. (Exh. A, Decree of Divorce).

Based on this decree and

despite counsel's objections, Judge Draney waived any showing of
changed circumstances prior to modifying custody herein, (tr. 2,
3, 167; R. 140-144.)
Appellant submits that the law in Utah is clearly
opposed to the parties1 stipulation as stated in the Divorce
Decree and that it was improper for this Court to not follow
legal precedent and require a showing of substantial change of
circumstances prior to modifying the custody decree.

Certainly,

the rationale for the bifurcated modification process in the
custody area is totally applicable to the case at bar and mitigates against the Court's attempt to side step this vital legal
requirement.

The Utah Supreme Court set forth this reasoning in

the Hogge case as follows:
"This would protect the custodial parent from harassment
by repeated litigation and protect the child from "ping
pong" custody awards....[in] apparent response to the
importance of stability and custody arrangements, many
states have adopted a bifurcated procedure for considering petitions to modify custody awards, (citations
omitted)." Supra at 54.
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Clearly, in the present case these children would be at
risk for a future of "ping pong" custody awards if the Court were
to consider their wishes as controlling in every instance as the
parties1 Divorce Decree provides. As argued in closing at trial,
the childrens1 wishes can only be one of many factors for the
court to consider before changing custody. Utah Code Annotated
§30-3-10. More important than the child's preferences is the
Court's objective assessment of the "best interests" of the
child, and the past conduct and moral standards of the parties.
UCA §30-3-10. Relying on a chiLd's preference alone is unsuitable
for obvious reasons. A child is easily influenced and manipulated; the maturity and insight of minors varies widely; and
improper considerations may motivate the expressed desire to
change custody such as wanting a more lenient parent over one who
applies rules. Of these factors, we have no way of knowing what
the maturity level of these children are, although we do know
they are very young at age 11 and 13. We also know that there is
far less supervision in Respondent's household as proposed to Mr.
Bake who applies rules and has high expectations of his sons.
It is noteworthy that the Decree of Divorce in this case
not only provided for a change of custody based on the preference
of the children but also gave Vickey Bake extremely liberal visitation consisting of every weekend, the entire summer, cind alternating holidays. Such a generous visitation award could allow a
caring parent to maintain a close bond to her children with fre-
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quent contact. Sadly, Vickey Bake ignored this opportunity to
maintain contact with her children.

Rather, after she was

divorced in August, 1985, Vickey Bake had four visits in four
months with her sons. In all of 1986, out of fifty-two weeks she
had eight visits and in 1987, January through May there were two
visits. Additionally, there was unrefuted testimony of frequent
abuses of visitation which adversely affected the children where
Vickey Bake made arrangements and would not show up. Also, there
was an occasion when she refused to return the children on time
and they missed school. Thus, instead of remaining a strong presence in her sons lives, Mrs. Bake gave them scant attention
until Mr. Bake asserted his interest in custody of Steven
Springer which generated the Respondent's counterclaim for
custody.
If nothing else, this erratic and dismal record of
visitation by a non-custodial parent should have been considered
by the Court in evaluating whether the stipulation entered by the
parties in 1985 to change custody based solely on the children's
preferences alone should be given any weight when the other parts
of the Decree providing liberal visitation were not adhered to.
Unfortunately, Judge Draney makes no comment whatsoever on these
points choosing to ignore Vickey Bake's neglect of her sons by
failing to visit and the fact that the boys were in fact thriving
in the care of Mr. Bake and his family.

Instead the Court seems

to apply a bias in favor of mothers having custody instead of
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weighing the evidence.

Such a bias is clearly reversible error,

as is the Court's failure to require a showing of changed circumstances.

Marchant v.

Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Ut. App. 1987).

II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING
A MODIFICATION CHANGING CUSTODY TO VICKEY BAKE.
The trial evidence strongly shows that the Judge should
have maintained the existing custody award set forth in the
Divorce Decree rather than modifying that order. Although a trial
court judge is granted broad discretion in making custody determinations, a Court must apply legal standards to the decision
making process which rationally relate to the ultimate conclusions in the custody process. Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 # 425
(Ut. 1986). It is particularly because of this broad discretion
that a trial court judge must carefully weigh all of the evidence
presented and rule within established legal guidelines to arrive
at proper conclusions. In the instant case, the trial court
totally failed in this charge.
A. Legal Standards in custody modification determinations.
The threshold issue in a custody modification is whether
the moving party has shown a substantial change of circumstances
which justifies reopening the custody issue. (Reference Point I,
this Brief.) If this burden is met, the court has continuing
jurisdiction to make changes in custody which are found to be
"reasonable and necessary." UCA 30-3-5(3).
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Although a child custody proceeding is equitable in
nature, nevertheless, a determination of the "best interests of
the children" is the standard and must be fairly evaluated by the
Court. Kallas v^

Kallas 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Ut. 1980).

On numerous occasions this Court has set forth factors
which should be considered in arriving at conclusions regarding
the "best interests of children". In Hutchinson v. Hutchinson,
649 P.2d 38 (Ut. 1982), this Court listed factors to consider in
reviewing a child's best interest which focused on the child's
feelings or needs, and also factors which relate primarily to the
character or status of the proposed custodians.
Among the factors focusing on the child's needs were:
the preference of the child; keeping siblings together; the
strength of the child's bond with prospective custodians; and, in
some cases, the general interests in continuing previously determined custody arrangments where the child is happy and well
adjusted. Among the factors focusing on the character of the
custodians, the Court listed: moral character and emotional stability; duration and depth of desire for custody; ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care; significant impairment
of the ability to function as a parent through drug abuse,
excessive drinking, or other cause; reasons for having
relinquished custody in the past; religious compatabiliy with the
child; and, financial condition, (citations omitted) Hutchinson
at pg. 41. Certainly, the assessment of the applicability and

-30-

weight of these various facts in a given case is within the
court's discretion. However, a court may not arbitrcirily substitute factors which are not functionally related to the "best
interest of the child" standard. Smith v. Smith, supra;
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, supra.
B. Judge Draney Misapplied the Law in Modifying the
Custody Award to Neal Bake.
The Findings of Fact entered by Judge Draney show a
total misapplication of the foregoing law to the facts of this
case. These findings show no basis whatsoever for terminating the
custody of Neal Bake which existed uninterrupted for a period of
over two years prior to the Modification Order. The Supreme Court
has held that Findings of Fact must demonstrate a rationale and
logical basis for the ultimate decision on custody by references
to pertinent factors that relate to the best interest of the
child, including specific attributes of the parents. Smith v.
Smith, supra.
The Findings of Fact in the present case were not logical, do not relate to the best interest of the children, show
bias on the part of the trial court, are not supported by the
evidence in the record and totally ignore critical elements of
the Defendant/Appellant's evidence.
1. Findings of Fact 3, 4. (3) "Plaintiff lives in a
doublewide mobile home with her husband, his daughter Rachel,
age 5 and Plaintiff's nephew Steven, age 14. The home is located
in the business district of Roosevelt, Utah, on the same lot,
somewhat removed from a building containing a cafe and a lounge.
The home is adequate in size and upkeep for its present occupants
and for the boys which are the subject of this action."
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(4) "The Defendant works in Sandy, Utah, with his
parents in a residential area of the city. The home is adequate
in size and upkeep for its present occupants including the boys."
These findings appear to imply that the parties are
similarly situated and have comparable households. That is definitely not the case as reflected in the record. The Court makes
no mention that the bar where respondent works is 100 feet from
her trailer and that there have been fights both inside and outside of the bar which have required police intervention, (tr.
25.) The size and amenities of the homes are also vastly different where respondents live in a three bedroom trailer with two
adults and four children (including the children at issue) and
appellant resides in a five bedroom home with three adults and
two children where the children have a separate play room, a
large yard and the school next door. (tr. 89,90.)
2. Findings of Fact 5, 6. (5) "Plaintiff is employed as
a waitress at the lounge near her home and works from 8:00 p.m.
to 1:00 a.m. While she is working, Steven cares for Rachel, and
there was no evidence that the arrangement had not worked satisfactorily. Plaintiff would be with the boys virtually every day."
(6) "Defendant works as a long haul truck driver and is
away from home the majority of the time. While he is away, his
mother cares for the boys."
These very significant findings are a distortion of the
trial evidence, conclusory, and parts of them are simply
inaccurate. While the Court notes that Plaintiff would "be with
the boys virtually every day" there appears to be no mention or
weight given to the fact that all four children would be unsuper-
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vised after 8:00 p.m. at least five nights a week because both
Respondent and her husband are working in the bar until 1:00
a.m.. Concerning the Defendant, the Court notes that he is a long
haul truck driver and states he is away from home "the majority
of the time". This is simply not true. Mr. Bake's testimony was
that he was home most weekends and holidays, (tr. 88) There
was also testimony that he called his sons on nearly a daily
basis while he was gone and spent virtually all of his free time
with them when he was home. (tr. 97, 120, 121.) The Court also
ignores Mr. Bake's testimony about his efforts to obtain local
truck driving employment so he could spend more time with his
children and the fact that he had already changed jobs and
reduced his income only because the job allowed him to spend more
time with his sons. (tr. 88.) The Court also ignores totally Mrs.
Cora Bake's testimony that she cares for the boys on a daily
basis and is present when they come home from school every day.
(tr. 118, 119). Importantly, the Court altogether misses the fact
that Mr. Bake's household provides constant adult supervision for
the children where Vickey Bake's has no adults present cifter 8:00
p.m.. There was also significant evidence that the boys benefited
from the supervision in Mr. Bake's home as they got good grades,
were healthy, obedient and maintained close family ties. In
contrast, the lack of supervision by Vickey Bake resulted in the
deterioration of the children's behavior after visitation.
3

* Findings of Fact 8. "The boys have expressed a strong
desire to live with the Plaintiff, stating that they want to be
with her and with their cousin Steven, and they enjoy school more
in Roosevelt and that their friends are in Roosevelt."
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It is clear by statute and case law that in a custody
decision the preferences of a minor child are not controlling of
the custody decision and are merely one factor among many for a
court to consider. Williams v. Williams, supra; U.C.A.,
§30-30-10; see this Brief, Point I infra. Additionally, the Court
only briefly interviewed the children in chambers and made no
record of that interview. The Court makes no reference to the
questions asked of the children, does not assess their credibility or maturity and thus does not lay a proper foundation for
expressing these desires as a court "finding" on which a change
of custody can be based. Most importantly, this shows that this
court is again being selective and biased in its treatment of the
evidence. It is noteworthy that there are no findings showing the
objective success of the children in Mr. Bake's care despite
substantial evidence at trial. There is unrefuted

testimony that

the children were actively engaged in extracurricular activities,
scouting, music lessons, that they had friends and activities
they enjoyed, and that they were succeeding in school and in
every way appeared to be thriving, (tr. 97, 101-105, 118-122.)

4. Findings of Fact 9. "A very favorable picture of
Defendant's home and care for the boys is presented by the testimony of Defendant and his mother. However, the validity of their
testimony is adversely affected by significant discrepancies in
the evidence presented by them."
While acknowledging a "very favorable picture of
Defendant's home and care for the boys" and in finding No. 8,
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also acknowledging that Defendant has a deep concern and ability
to care for the boys needs, the Court nevertheless seems to
decide that none of the testimony of Mr. Bake or his witnesses
are to be believed. This testimony is thrown out because of
"significant discrepancies'1 and yet no such discrepcincies are
described in the Court's findings and conclusions.
Additionally, the Court significantly hampered the presentation of Defendant's case by prohibiting testimony concerning
the caretaking of Steven Springer by Vickey Bake. (tr. 100.) As
was argued at trial, this testimony was extremely important as it
is the best evidence of Vickey Bake's caretaking abilities and
the Court had no other evidence than Mrs. Bake's own testimony on
which to assess her parenting abilities. At the outset of the
trial the Court did not allow a custody evaluation and none had
been done at the initial divorce, rather, custody was awarded by
agreement of the parties.
The Court's failure to specify the "significant discrepancies in the evidence" is also very misleading. It is
impossible to know whether the evidence in which the Court saw
discrepancies related to the best interest of the children and
yet these "discrepancies" alone seem to be enough for the Court
to totally discount the testimony of Mr. Bake and his mother.
Without further specificity it is impossible to understand this
finding which is unsupported, vague and sheds no light on the
court's ruling.
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5. Findings of Fact 10. "It was the uncontroverted
testimony of the Plaintiff that the Defendant recently said to
her "you had better get your boys back".
In the Defendants post-trial motion to have the court
reopen judgment and direct entry of a new judgment, and for a
stay of proceedings to enforce judgment, the Defendant's
Affidavit was attached and at paragraph 11 thereof, Defendant
denies that he made the statement to Plaintiff "you had better
get your boys back". (Motion and Affidavit, is attached hereto,
Exhibit C.) Rather, in that Affidavit he recalls telling Vickey
Bake that she should "straighten up her act" if she ever wanted
to regain custody of the boys. Mr. Bake also explained that he,
at no time, suggested he did not want to care for the boys,
rather, that he has repeatedly discussed with Vickey issues concerning her lifestyle and care of the boys which he believes is
harmful to them. (R.

120-129.)

Additionally, a review of the trial transcript provides
more meaning to Mr. Bake's out-of-context statement cited in
this Finding. The transcript shows Vickey Bake went on to explain
that Neal also said "you have got to start working on making
things right like I want them so you can have them back." (tr.
18.) When Finding 8 is read in context with this follow-up statement, the meaning is clarified to be a statement merely commenting on Mrs. Bake's lifestyle, and not a veiled threat
concerning custody as the Court seems to imply. Frankly, no other
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interpretation makes sense nor does the court express in its
conclusions or other findings what interpretation it makes or
weight is given to Finding 10. Again, this Finding certainly has
no relevance to the best interests of the children and seems only
to show the Court's unexplained dissatisfaction with Mr. Bake.
In short, this unsupported and vague finding of fact
does not provide a rationale basis on which the Court can make a
custody modification order.
In conclusion, the trial court has entirely failed to
provide a rationale, factual basis for the ultimate decision by
drafting Findings with references to pertinent facts on the best
interests of the children. Smith v. Smith, supra at 426. As
stated in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999, (Ut. 1987), findings :
"should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was revealed."
The only factor outlined in Hutchinson, supra, which
appears in these inadequate findings is that of preferences of
the children which should not be controlling. Rather, the Court
ignored valid, unrefuted evidence which was presented concerning
the Hutchinson factors. To summarize, there was testimony from
Mrs. Cora Bake, Mr. Nelson and Mr. Bake of the very strong bond
between Neal Bake and the children. There was testimony concerning Mr.

Bake's personal sacrifices to spend time with his

children and of the close contacts and communication which he
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maintained with them. There was testimony concerning his sensitivity and responsiveness to the needs of his children such as
taking them to counseling when it was appropriate and setting up
structured study times in response to poor grades. There was
testimony that Mr. Bake's household was structured and well organized, that the children had appropriate discipline with time-out
and that they were always under adult supervision. There was also
testimony concerning adverse factors in Vickey Bake's household
such as the daily alcohol use by her husband, his history of
court ordered treatment, the unrefuted testimony of Respondent
that she was "tired of raising children" as a reason for
relinquishing custody initially, and the very important objective
evidence of Respondent's minimal contact with the children during
the two years since the divorce. The trial court makes absolutely
no mention of the foregoing testimony and evidence which was presented to the Court and which represent factors that the Supreme
Court held to be determinative in custody cases.
C. The Court Should have Affirmed the Divorce Decree
Custody Award to Neal Bake and Abused its Discretion
in modifying that order.
If the Court had properly reviewed the factors and legal
standards of Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, supra, the Court should
have affirmed the original custody award to Neal Bake and made no
modification thereof. There is simply no evidence on the record
which points to disturbing the present custody arrangement after
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the children have been in the care of Mr. Bake for over two
years, have become well adjusted to the Salt Lake City area, have
become involved in their school and have gained friends and
established new successful routines in Appellant's household.
Despite evidence and argument, the court absolutely ignored these
factors of stability and continuity in the childs' lives. The
Court also ignored testimony by Appellant's witnesses of Neal
Bake's commitment to his family and extended family.

There was

no reference in the Court's opinion nor explanation by Vickey
Bake of why she had not seen her father Bud Nelson for four
years. Mr. Nelson testified at trial that he had no ideci why she
did not keep in touch even though he had made continuing efforts
to reestablish contact. Instead, it was Mr. Bake that maintained
the family connection with his grandsons to his ex-wife's parents
through visits and regular communications. Mr. Nelson testified
to the closeness he observed between Mr. Bake and his grandsons
and that the children were well cared for and happy in his care.
There was also absolutely no mention in the Court's opinion of the unstable and erratic history exhibited by the
Respondent since the divorce. In the two years since the divorce
she had moved five times and in two states. She and her husband
had experienced periods of unemployment and are on food stamps to
supplement their income.

Respondent's witness George Glinds the

landlord of Respondent and owner of the "Id Lounge" testified
that he was a receiver appointed by the Bankruptcy Court to
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operate the lounge. Thus, it is questionable whether that
employment is stable and certainly, Respondents job history is
of unskilled labor with her longest employment being Pizza Hut
where she worked for only two years.
In contrast to Vickey Bake's own unstable lifestyle
with frequent changes of residence and employment, Mr. Bake has
lived ever since his separation with his parents in Sandy.

They

have a large home and are a closely bonded and supportive family
who have all been active in the caretaking of the children. The
importance of extended family support and stability such as the
appellant's

was recognized as highly important to the custody

decision in the case of Hirsch v. Hirsch, 41 Ut. Adv. Rep. 4
(9-5-86).
Lastly, the Court totally omitted any reference to
Vickey Bake's pattern of visitation during the two and a half
years after the parties' divorce. The highly unusual and objective evidence of a daily contemporaneous log was presented to the
Court and was not refuted except by the testimony that there may
have been a few emergency phone calls which the record keeper
Mrs. Bake was not aware of. Outside of this, there was no testimony to refute the fact that in the first five months of 1987
from January through May there were only two actual visits, one
letter and two phone calls which were not for the purpose to
arrange visits. There was no testimony to refute that in 1986
there was only one letter in January, no contact whatsoever
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in April, or September; only one card in November and in December
one card and one letter. The Court also failed to mention the
insensitive and often reckless behaviour of the Respondent which
could have a definite impact on her parenting abilities., Among
these examples are when the parties son Kyle was allowed to play
with a knife and cut himself during visitation. Additionally,
Kyle suffered from an asthma attack which required hospitalization during visitation and when he was returned no mention was
made of this incident so Mr. Bake had no way of knowing what
follow-up care or risk may still have existed from this illness.
Additionally, there was testimony that police intervention was
required to assist Mr. Bake in retrieving children after visitation and that the children were sometimes not returned in a
timely fashion which caused them to miss school. Also, there was
the

visitation incident when Vickey Bake arrived an hour early

and proceeded to simply walk in the house and take the children
away without informing their caretaker that she was taking the
children. None of this irresponsible and possibly endangering
behaviour by Mrs. Bake was referred to in the Court's opinion.
Finally, the Court restricted testimony concerning Vickey Bake f s
caretaking of the only related minor child in her care, that is,
Steven Springer. There was testimony by the social services personnel of several child neglect referrals concerning Steven
Springer and yet the Court still barred questioning on this point
as "irrelevant" to Mrs. Bake's caretaking abilities.
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Based upon the court's apparent prejudice, failure to
review appropriate factors, its failure to apply the law, and the
positive factors which preponderate in favor of Neal Bake's
having continued custody of the minor children Nathan and Kyle,
it is apparent that the Court abused its discretion. As this
Court has traditionally held and recently stated:
"This Court will not overturn a trial court's custody
determination on appeal unless the evidence clearly
shows that the determination was not in the best
interest of the child or that the trial Court misapplied
a applicable principles of law1'. Smith v. Smith, at 425.

This case is one of those clear instances when the Court
abused it's discretion and should be reversed.
III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING CHILD
SUPPORT TO VICKEY BAKE
The Decree of Divorce stated that "based

on the par-

ties' income and their agreement, Plaintiff should have no obligation to pay child support. Alimony was also waived by the
parties. (Ex. A, Findings of Fact, para. 7 ) . At trial, the
financial declaration statements were submitted by both parties,
and the Court found that Vickey Bake earned $1,217.00 per month
and the Defendant earned $1,109.24 per month. Based on these findings the Court entered a support order that Mr. Bake should pay
the sum of $115.00 per month, per child to Mrs. Bake.
Appellant submits that these conclusory findings by the
court assessing child support against Mr. Bake are totally inade-
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quate and are reversible error. The Utah Supreme Court has
clearly held that the trial court must make findings on all
material issues. Acton

v. Deliran, supra. The findings made by

Judge Draney on child support do not specifically set forth the
financial condition or need for support, including earning capacity or ability to pay for either party. Such a failure to
address the basic factors necessary to make a proper support
award requires reversal of that award. Rather, the Court should
have considered all of the factors set forth in Utah Code
Annotated, §78-45-7 which states:

"The Court, in determining the amount of prospective
support, shall consider all relevant factors including
but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living in situation of the parties 7
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) at the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the
support of others.
All of the above factors constitute material issues
upon which the trial court must enter Findings of Fact. Jefferies
v. Jefferies, 80 Ut.Adv.Rept. 18 (4-13-88). Additionally, in the
present case the Court gave great deference on other issues to
the parties1 stipulation as incorporated in their Decree of
Divorce.

That stipulation waives support and alimony and should

have been a consideration in awarding support herein. Certainly,
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the fact that Vickey Bake, the recipient of the support earns
more than Neal Bake would have been an important factor to consider in assessing this support award. The Court makes no mention
of this fact and nor does the Court disclose the basis for its
$115.00 per month assessment which is higher than the Uniform
Child Support Schedule used by the Utah Office of Recovery
Services.
For these reasons the Court's award of child support is
vague, based on insufficient findings, and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
On the issue of custody modification the Court erred at
the outset of trial by proceeding without the requested custody
evaluation and by failing to have respondent carry her burden of
proof to establish a substantial, material change of circumstances before reopening the custody issue. The Findings of Fact concerning the custody award are clearly not dispositive of the best
interest of the children, constitute a misapplication of the law
to the facts, wholly failed to consider prominent basis that this
Court has asserted should be controlling in custody matters, and
discloses an apparent bias by the trial court against Mr. Bake's
continuing custody. The Court also fails to make sufficient findings or follow applicable legal standards in setting the child
support herein. This Court should reverse the judgment of the
trial court as abuses of discretion and enter judgment in
accordance with the controlling cases set forth herein, and the
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facts and the record which Appellant submits require affirming
the original custody award of the minor children to Neal Bake.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *2f day of July, 1988.

JZANNE/MARELIUS
/
ttora^y for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing "Appellant's Brief" to Attorney for the
Respondent, Mr. Clark Allred, NIELSEN & SENIOR, 36 South State,
Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid this
day of July, 1988.

28491(501)
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STATUTES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION

30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of
parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony. (1) When a decree of
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it such orders in relation to
the children, property and parties, and the maintenance and health care
of the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court shall include
in every decree of divorce an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the
dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court
may also include an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children.
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent
changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, and
health and dental care, or the distribution of the'property as shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and
other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child.
(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order
of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall automatically terminate upon the remarriage of that former spouse, unless that
marriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, in which case alimony
shall resume, providing that the party paying alimony be made a party
to the action of annulment and that party's rights are determined.
(3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
shall be terminated upon application of that party establishing that the
former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex, unless it is
further established by the person receiving alimony that the relationship
or association between them is without any sexual contact.

30-3-10. Custody of children. In any case of separation of husband
and wife having minor children, or whenever a marriage is declared void
or dissolved the court shall make such order for the future care and custody of the minor children as it may deem just and proper. In determining
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and the
past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The
court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's
desires regarding the future custody; however, such expressed desires shall
not be controlling and the court may, nevertheless, determine the children's custody otherwise.

78-45-7. Determination of amount of support.—(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court order unless
there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of the
obligor or obligee.
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material change in
circumstances has occurred, the court in determining the amount of
prospective support, shall consider all relevant factors including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others.
(3) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and
assess all arrearages based upon, but not limited to:
(a) The amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if any;
(b) The funds that have been reasonably and necessarily expended in
support of spouse and children.

«j
••:«« «f nroDertv - Maintenance and health care of
: " - J f t ^ - c Z ^ * * * ^ * * jurisdiction - Coparties « * * ^ r £ ^ * m of alimony. (1) When a decree of
tody and <"**"»
^ ™ ™ i n c l u d e i„ it such orders in relation to
divorce is rendered, the court may inc
,he children, • " J - g - i ' ^ ' S % £ £ X . court .hail include
•' I v t r T S e ol S v l t an M r . a s k i n g reapo.sibi.it, for the payis every decree « " "
medical and dental expenses of the
r e
?"" l t
c S » If c o v e X T s ^ l a b i e at a reasonaMe rt the co««
dependent children^ it « « J * . rf tte p o r c h a se and maintenance of
may also mclude an order «W%J
* i M u r M c e f o r AaK
AMm.
appropnate J ^ } * J ^ J S i nJuu r i Js d i c t i o n to make such subsequent
The court shall have ~ ™ " £
^
, n d maintenance of the
rt
" " ^ r c u s ^ r f T h * S S t a I d ^ s u p p o r t , maintenance and
J ' t r . S Z t a l care or the distribuUon of the property as shall be reshealth and dental care, or v
grandparents, and
.enable and " X X e l Z ^ d e r a t i o n the welfare of the child.
°lm " S E T . d ^ o V o C c T s p e d n c a l l , provides otherwise any order
f l r r ^ p a r ^ p a y — t o
J * - * ^ £ * £
30 8 5

„ S b^rminated
S ^ g f ^ r u T S ^ ^ A
M
£ C , K s ? e d b y ' u f e ^ s o n S v i n g alimony that the relations*,
. " R a t i o n between them is without an, sexual contact

ADDENDUMS AND EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT A

GAYLE F. MCKEACHNTE
CLARK B. ALLRED
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
363 East Main Street
Vernal , Utah
84078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIA*. DISTRICT CO'/RT OV '^.VrlKUNL COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VICKEY L. BAKE,
DIVORCE DECPEF
Plaintiff,
vs .

s

J r-

^

NEAL F. BAKE,
Defendant.

Civil No.

Pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made
in chis matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce dissolving the

bonds or matrimony now existing between the parties, the sanv- to
become final on signing and entry,
2.

Defendant is awarded the care, custody, and control of

the minor children subject to the right of Plaintiff to visit the
children at reasonable times and places including havina the boys
on weeKends, the summer vacation and every other holiday.

The

alternating

New

holidays

shall

be

Christmas,

Thanksgiving,

Year's, July 4th, July 24th, Labor Day and Memorial Day.
the boys are with

the Plaintiff

shall have visitation

in the summer, the

rights on every weekend.

All

When

Defendant
important

decisions

reqarding

the

shall

discussed

between

be

hoys,

surh

the

as medical

parties.

and

Since

the

schooling,
award

of

custody is based 0*1 the desire of the children in the event the
boys change their mind

and express a desire to return to live

with their mother custody will be changed awarding custody to the
Plaintiff without a need to show a change of circumstances.
the event custody

is changed

In

to the Plaintiff, then Defendant

will be entitled to the visitation riqhts outlined herein for the
Plaintiff.
3.

Defendant is hereby ordered and obligated to pay all ol

the debts and obligations

incurred by the parties or either of

them prior to the filing of this action and the Defendant shall
provide medical and dental insurance for the children.
4.

Plaintiff

is

awarded

the

mobile

home

and

premises

located at Roosevelt, Utah suoject to any liens thereon, the six
and one-third

acres located

Ford pickup trucks, the

in Neoia, Utah, the 1979 &*&—19 0-5-

1970 Javelin

automobile, -£-ke—ten—foot

•camping—b-Esailer and her personal property.
5.

Defendant

is

awarded

all

his

personal

property

presently in his possession, -< -"'>«. ^ U< <-••*, ->^ .* A ~ <-€,.ceS S*> 6 * <r£s *

6.

Defendant is ordered to reimburse Plaintiff the sum of

$250.00 for part of the legal fees and costs she has incurred
herein.
DATED this

day of July, 1985.

APPROVED AS TO FORM: v^

District Judge
Richard C. Davidson

GAY LB F .
CLARK B .

McKi.ACHNIE
All,RED

NIELSEN *> SENIOR
A 1 1 o r r. rj y> f v> c Pl^« i nt** i f f

36 3 East Main Street
Vernal, t;tah 34078
Tcijphone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

V'ICKEY L. BAKE,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)

NFAL F. BAKE,

)

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

FINDINGS 01 FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

Civil No.

This matter was heard before me, Judge of the above entitled
Court, ;>n the

day of

, 1935.

Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by Clark 3.
Allred, attorney.
Defendant

Defendant was not present in Court.

and

Plaintiff

have

entered

into

the

written

stipulation and property settlement agreement and Defendant has
waived the JQ day period between the filing of the Complaint and
the hearing for the decree of divorce.
The Court

found

that good

cause existed

for waiving

the

remainder of the 90 day waiting period between the filing of the
Complaint and the hearing for the decree of divorce and the Court
heard

the

stipulation

testimony
and

of

property

the

Plaintiff

settlement

and

approved

agreement

and

a

written

after

being

fuLly advised, makes these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff

)f Due1. • -.•,. :e County, State of

is a re.; id^nt

Utah, and has been for rrore than three months immediate ly prior
to the commencement of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant

are husbari'i _ii: ri wifv, having

married on August 1, 1972.
3.

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

are

the

parents

of

the

fullowing minor children as issue of tnis marriage, to-wit:

4.

Nathen Frank

October 10, 1974

Kyle Kirk

December 17, 1976

Defendant is a fit and proper person to be awarded the

care, custody and control of the minor children and the children
have expressed a desire to live with tne Defendant.
have agreed

that

since

the award

The parties

oi custody j^s_jD^a^ed

on

the

desires of the children that in the event the boys ch^nqe their
mind and express a desire to return to live with

their mother

that custody will be changed awarding custody to the Plaintiff
without a need to show a change of circumstances.
5.

Plaintiff should have reasonable visitation rights with

the minor children

including

having

the boys on weekends, the

summer and every other holiday. The alternating

holidays being

Christmas, Thanksgiving, New Year's July 4th, July
Day and Memorial Day.

24th, Labor

When the boys are with the Plaintiff in
2

the summer, the Defendant should have visitation rights on every
weekend.
the

In the nvent the custody ui the children is changed,

Defendant

should

be

entitled

to

the

visitation

rights

outlined herein for the Plaintiff.
6.

Defendant

has

treated

Plaintin

cruelly, causing

her

great mental distress and suffering.
7.

Based

on

the

parties

income

and

their

Plaintiff should have no dufey to pay child support.

agreement

Both parties

have waived any claim to alimony.
y^

Defendant should be obligated to pay all of the debtF

and obligations incurred by the parties or either of them during
the marriage and the Defendant should provide medical and dental
insurance for the children.
yf 9.

The

parties
t*j

have
?/•? / /

certain
:

- '<

divided as follows: '
a.

« ^

property
sJ*

t

which

should

be

-^

The mobile home and premises located at Roosevelt, Utah

subject to any liens thereon, the six ana one-third acres located
in Neola, Utah,^ the 1979 -«*a—i-9GS- Ford pickup trucks', the 1970
Javelin automobile, - the ten foot eampinc -trailer and her personal
property should be awarded to Plaintiff.
b.

All his personal property presently in his possession

should be awarded to Defendant. /i< LS,^

7L* >+'-<«*i <v* * /*J/ **.-<>,*/<. &y ?£s

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes:
1*

Plaintiff

is entitled
3

to be

awarded

a divorce

from

Defendant, the decree to become final o\\ its signing and entry.
2.

Defendant is entitled

and control of
Plaintiff

to be awarded the care, ^pstody

the minor or children

to visit

the minor

children

subject

to the right of

at reasonable

times in*!

places including having the boys on weekends, the summer school
vacation and every other holiday.

The alternating holidays being

Christmas, Thanksgiving, New Year's, July 4th, July 24th, Labor
Day and Memorial Day.

When the boys are with the Plaintiff in

the summer, the Defendant shall have visitation rights on every
weekend.

All

important decisions

regarding

the boys, such

is

medical and schooling, shall be discussed between the parties.
Since

this

award

of

custody

is

based

on

the

desire

of

the

children in the event the boys change their mind and express a
desire to return to live with their mother that custody will be
changed awarding custody to the Plaintiff without a need to show
a change of circumstances.
the

Plaintiff,

then

the

In the event custody is changed
Defendant

will

be

entitled

to

to
the

visitation outlined herein for the Plaintiff.
3.

Alimony by both parties is waived.

4.

Defendant should be obligated to pay all of the debts

and obligations incurred by the parties or either of them during
the marriage and the Defendant should provide medical and dental
insurance for the children.
5.

Plaintiff

should

be

awarded

the

mobile

home

and

premises located at Roosevelt, Utah subject to any liens thereon,
4

the six and one-third acres located in Neola, Utah,, the 1979 *f.(l.
-1965 Ford pickup

truckp', the 1970 Javtlin

automobile, -JrU^-fcc r,

—4o«rt—crcTmpifKj tra-ileir and her personal property.
should

be

awarded

all his personal

possession.
6.

property
"-^

Defendant

should

pay

to

* -r

Plaintiff

District Judge
Richard C. Davidson
.vr...>. /

- •,.

... •

;

5

in

his

<-«<- .00. *r-j .

day of July, 1985.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defendant

presently

reimbursement for part of her legal fees.
DATED this

The

$250.00

as

CLARK B. ALLRED
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE
NIELSEN U SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-490?
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CCL'Kl OF DUCHHSN!! COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

VICKEY L. BAKE,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)

NEAI. F. BAKE,

)

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

)

STIPULATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

Civil No. 35-CV-137D

WHEREAS, the Plaintiff has filed a complaint for divorce and
whereas the parties have agreed regarding the division of their
property,

the

payment

or

support

and

the

custody

of

their

children, and;
WHEREAS, the parties desire to set forth their agreement in
writing and requests
according

to

the

that the court enter a decree of divorce
terms

of

this

stipulation

and

property

settlement agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed as follows:
1.

The

parties

both

request

that

the

court

waive

any

further waiting period, that a decree of divorce be awarded to
Plaintiff and that the same become final on signing and entry.
2.

The parties have two children, Nathan Frank and Kyle

Kirk.
with

The two children have expressed a preference of residing
the

awarded

Defendant.
to

the

Therefore, it is agreed

Defendant

and

that

Plaintiff

that custody
have

bo

reasonable

visitation rights including have the boys on weekends, the summer
vacation
should

and

every

other

holiday.

The

alternating

be Christmas, Thanksgiving, New Year's, July

24th, Labor Day and Memorial Day.
Plaintiff

in

the

rights on every
important

summer,
weekend.

decisions

schooling shall

the

regarding

be discussed

4th, July

When the boys are with thp

Defendant

shall

parties

further

The

holidays

the

boys,

between

such

have

visitation

agree
as

the parties.

that all

medical

and

The parties

further agree that since this agreement on custody is based on
the desires of the children
their mind
mother

that

and

that in the event the boys change

express a desire

custody

will

be

to return to live with

changed

awarding

custody

their
to

the

Plaintiff without a need to show a change of circumstances.

In

the event custody is changed to the Plaintiff, then the Defendant
will be entitled to the visitation rights outlined herein for the
Plaintiff.
2.

OP

It is agreed that Plaintiff shall have no ^4fey to pay

child support.
3.

It

is

Both parties hereby waive any claim to alimony.
agreed

that

Defendant

shall

pay

all

medical

obligations and other bills incurred prior to the filing of this
action and

that

the Defendant will provide medical and dental

insurance for the children.
2

4.

It is agreed that Plaintiff should be awarded the mobile

home and premises located at Roosevelt, L'tah subject to any liens .0
thereon, the six and one-third acres located in Neola, Utah, 7 the
1979 <a£^a—l!)b5- Ford pickup-truck/, the 1970 Javelin

automobile,

-£he— ten foot eamping -trailer and hor personal property and that
Defendant should be awarded all his personal property presently
in his possession^ <W~<<>^ •/,.,- .-/v.,/ ** * /;*•' <«..,."«' ~* '-y *•'-•' f
5.

•*•'' ."° J

It is agreed that Defendant will reimburse Plaintiff the

sum of $250.00

for part of

the

legal

fees and

costs

she has

incurred herein
DATED this

of July, 1985.,
y

\ftrdkey L." BAKfe^
I

<

-

Neal F . Bake

3
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EXHIBIT B

CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
NIELSEN 6 SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VICKEY L. BAKE now known as
VICKEY L. ADDERLEY,

i
1

RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ORDER

i

Civil No. 85-CV-137D

Plaintiff,
vs.
NEAL F. BAKE,
Defendant.
The

above

captioned

matter

came

before

the

Domestic

Commissioner on May 18, 1987, pursuant to the Petitions filed by
both

parties.

Plaintiff was present

attorney, Clark B. Allred.

and

represented

by her

Defendant was present and represented

by his attorney, Suzanne Marelius.

The Court having reviewed the

Petitions, the financial statements

filed by the parties and

having discussed the matter with the parties makes the following
recommendations.
1.
be

Defendant's Petition regarding Steven Springer should

dismissed without prejudice.

The question of custody of

Steven Springer should either be handled through the Juvenile
Court or in the alternative a Petition for Guardianship should be

filed in the Probate Division of District Court.
uncertain
Steven

status

Springer,

of

the

the

Juvenile

Court

Commissioner

Because of the

proceeding

recommends

involving

that

presently

physical custody remain with the Plaintiff and Defendant have
reasonable visitation rights with Steven which should include
every other weekend, one day during the week when Defendant does
not have weekend visitation and six weeks in the summer, being
either a continuous six weeks or two three week periods depending
on Steven's schedule.
2.

Unless Defendant can provide proof that Plaintiff has

the tools requested in his Counter-Petition or can show that
Plaintiff has had possession of said tools and disposed of the
same his Counter-Petition should be dismissed.
3.
of

The Plaintiff's Petition reguesting a change of custody

the

two

minor

children,

Nathan

and

Kyle,

requires

a

determination by the Court as to what is the best interest of the
children.

The Decree has waived

circumstances.

the need

a

change of

In order for the Court to determine what is in

the best interest of the children
custody

for

evaluation be performed

it is recommended

that a

and the Commissioner

further

recommends that only one evaluator be retained by both parties
and that both parties share the costs.
Defendant has 10 days in which to make specific objections
2

to the Recommendations and Order.
DATED this

day of May, 1987.
Howard Maetani
Domestic Commissioner

The above recommendations are hereby adopted by the Court
and incorporated as the Court's Recommendations and Order.
DATED this

day of May# 1987.
Dennis L. Draney
District Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Suzanne Marelius
Attorney for Defendant
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EXHIBIT C

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

VICKEY L. BAKE,
Plaintiff,

R U L I N G

vs.
NEAL F. BAKE,
Defendant.

Civil No. 85-CV-137D

This matter came on for hearing on January 19, 1988 and was
re-convened on January 21, 1988. Plaintiff was present and
represented by Clark B. Allred, and Defendant was present and
represented by Suzanne Marelius.

Each of the parties and other

witnesses were called, and testified regarding the fitness of the
parties for custody, and the adequacy of the homes occupied by
the parties.

Upon stipulation of the parties and counsel, the

court interviewed each of the boys separately, in private, in
chambers.

Based upon the testimony given, the evidence received,

and the statements of the children, the court finds:
1. The Plaintiff lives in a double-wide mobile home with her
husband, his daughter Rachel, age 5 and Plaintiff's nephew Steven,
age 14. The home is located in the business district of Roosevelt,
Utah, on the same lot, somewhat removed from a building containing
a cafe and a lounge.

The home is adequate in size and upkeep for

its present occupants and for the boys which are the subject of
this action.

2.

The Defendant lives in Sandy, Utah with his parents in

a residential area of the city.

The home is adequate in size and

upkeep for its present occupants including the boys.
3.

Plaintiff is employed as a waitress at the lounge near

her home, and works from 8:00 P.M. to 1:00 A.M.

While she is

working, Steven cares for Rachel, and there was no evidence that
the arrangement has not worked satisfactorily.

Plaintiff would

be with the boys virtually every day.
4.

Defendant works as a long-haul truck driver, and is away

from home the majority of the time.

While he is away, his mother

cares for the boys.
5.

Both of the parties have a deep concern for the boys, and

have the ability to care for their needs.
6.

The boys have expressed a strong desire to live with the

Plaintiff, stating that they want to be with her and with their
cousin Steven, and they enjoy school more in Roosevelt, and that
their friends are in Roosevelt.
7.

A very favorable picture of Defendant's home and care for

the boys is presented by the testimony of the Defendant and his
mcther.

However, the validity of their testimony is adversely

affected by significant discrepancies in the evidence presented by
them.
8.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the Plaintiff that

the Defendant recently said to her "You'd better get your boys
back."
9.

Plaintiff earms #1,217.00 per month, and supports her

nephew, Steven. Defendant earns $1,109.24 per month.

-2-

Based on the foregoing findings, the court concludes that the
best interests of the boys are served by awarding their custody
to the Plaintiff, subject to the reasonable visitation rights of
the Defendant.

Therefore, Plaintiff's petition is granted, and

the Decree of Divorce is modified to award the care, custody and
control of Nathan Bake and Kyle Bake to the Plaintiff, now Vickey
L. Adderly.

Defendant is awarded visitation rights as previously

awarded to Plaintiff.

Defendant is ordered to pay child support

to the Plaintiff in the sum of $115.00 per month per child, and
is ordered to maintain health and accident insurance on the children.
Each party is to pay one-half {%) the cost of medical expenses not
covered by insurance.

If Defendant does not maintain such

insurance, he shall be responsible for all medical expense which
would have been covered by insurance.

The parties are ordered not

to do or say anything which will alienate the children from the
other parent, or from other close family members.
DATED this £jptfc day of January, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

AJ^^^
cc:

Clark B. Allred
Suzanne Marelius

G^-*

EXHIBIT D

CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VICKEY L. BAKE now known
as VICKEY L. ADDERLEY,

1
1

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
NEAL F. BAKE,
Defendant.

i

Civil No. 85-CV-137D

The above captioned matter came before the Court for trial
on January 19, 1988.
1988.

The trial was reconvened on January 21,

Plaintiff was present and represented by her attorney,

Clark B. Allred.
Suzanne Marelius.

Defendant was present and

represented by

The matter was before the Court, pursuant to

Plaintiff's Petition to Change Custody of the parties two minor
children.

Each of the parties and other witnesses were called

and testified regarding the issues before the Court.

The parties

and their counsel stipulated that the Court should interview each
of the two boys separately, in private, in chambers.

Based upon

the testimony and other evidence received and upon the statements
of the boys, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were divorced on August 19, 1985.

2.

The parties are the parents of two children, Nathan

Frank Bake born October 10, 1974 and Kyle Kirk Bake born December
17, 1976.
3.

The Plaintiff lives in a double-wide mobile home with

her husband, his daughter Rachel, age 5 and Plaintiff's nephew
Steven, age 14.
Roosevelt,

Utah,

The home is located in the business district of
on the

same

lot,

somewhat

building containing a cafe and a lounge.

removed

from a

The home is adequate in

size and upkeep for its present occupants and for the boys which
are the subject of this action.
4.

The Defendant lives in Sandy, Utah with his parents in

a residential area of the city.

The home is adequate in size and

upkeep for its present occupants including the boys.
5.

Plaintiff is employed as a waitress at the lounge near

her home, and works from 8:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.

While she is

working, Steven cares for Rachel, and there was no evidence that
the arrangement has not worked satisfactorily.

Plaintiff would

be with the boys virtually every day.
6.

Defendant works as a long-haul truck driver, and is

away from home the majority of the time.

While he is away, his

mother cares for the boys.
7.

Both of the parties have a deep concern for the boys,
2

and have the ability to care for their needs.
8.

The boys have expressed a strong desire to live with

the Plaintiff, stating that they want to be with her and with
their cousin Steven, and they enjoy school more in Roosevelt, and
that their friends are in Roosevelt.
9.

A very favorable picture of Defendant's home and care

for the boys is presented by the testimony of the Defendant and
his mother.

However,

the

validity

of

their

testimony

is

adversely affected by significant discrepancies in the evidence
presented by them.
10.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the Plaintiff

that the Defendant recently said to her "You'd better get your
boys back."
11.

Plaintiff earns $1,217.00 per month, and supports her

nephew, Steven.

Defendant earns $1,109.24 per month.

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters
the following Conclusions of Law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The parties two boys have expressed a desire to return

to live in the custody of their mother.
2.
their

It is in the best interest of the parties two boys that

custody

be

changed

to

the

Plaintiff, subject to the

Defendant having reasonable visitation rights.
3.

Plaintiff's Petition should be granted and the Decree
3

of Divorce modified to award the care, custody and control of the
two minor boys to the Plaintiff.
4.

Defendant should be awarded to pay child support to

Plaintiff the sum of $115.00 per month per child.
5.
on the

Defendant has health and accident insurance available
children

and

he

insurance on the children.

should

be ordered

to maintain that

The parties should split the costs of

any expenses not covered by insurance and if Defendant fails to
provide insurance he should be responsible for those medical
expenses.
DATED this

day of February, 1988.
Dennis L. Draney
District Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UINTAH

)
) ss.
)

Shelly Massey, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR,
Clark B. Allred, attorney for Plaintiff, herein; that she served
the attached FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW upon counsel
by placing a true and correct copy thereon in an envelope
addressed to:
Ms. Suzanne Marelius
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid

day of February, 1988.

Subscribed and
February, 1988.

sworn

My commission expires:
/^
II
^\ )//5>JP

to before- me
f)
A

this &
/—*N

Notary Public
Residing at Vernal, Utah

day of

CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055
GAYLE F. MCKEACHNIE - 2200
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VICKEY L. BAKE now known
as VICKEY L. ADDERLEY,

]
i
i

ORDER AND DECREE MODIFYING
DIVORCE DECREE

Plaintiff,

vs.
NEAL F. BAKE,
Defendant.

]I

Civil No. 85-CV-137D

The above captioned matter having come before the Court for
trial on January 19, 1988, and the Court having entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being fully advised,
hereby;
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that:
1.

The parties Divorce Decree is hereby modified and the

care, custody and control of the parties two minor boys, Nathan
Bake and Kyle Bake is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff, Vickey L.
Adderly.
2.

Defendant, Neal

rights with the children.

Bake, is hereby

awarded

visitation

The visitation rights are to be the

same as the visitation rights that were originally awarded to the
Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the parties Divorce Decree.

3.
of

Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum

$115.00 per month

per

child

as child

support

beginning

February, 1988.
4.

Defendant

is hereby ordered to maintain health and

accident insurance on the children.
half

of any medical

Each party is to pay one-

expense not covered by

insurance.

If

Defendant fails to maintain health and accident insurance on the
children then he will be responsible for all medical expenses
which would have been covered by that insurance.
5.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45d-2 Defendant

is authorized to institute the income withholding provisions of
Section 78-453-1 et. seq.

Whenever child support is delinquent

as defined by Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45d-l(4) appropriate
income withholding procedures shall apply to all existing and
further payors.

This provision shall remain in effect until the

Defendant no longer owes child support.
6.

It is further ordered that neither party shall do or

say anything which will alienate the children from the other
party or from other close family members.
DATED this

day of February, 1988.
Dennis L. Draney
District Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UINTAH

)
) ss.
)

Shelly Massey, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR,
Clark B. Allred, attorney for Plaintiff, herein; that she served
the attached ORDER AND DECREE MODIFYING

DIVORCE DECREE upon

counsel by placing a true and correct copy thereon in an envelope
addressed to:
Ms. Suzanne Marelius
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah, on the i j5
day of February, 1988.

Subscribed and
February, 1988.

sworn

My commission expires:
/7 A ^ ~ ljr ^ 0

prS/- £P fid*

to

before
~

me

this
^

S

Notary Public
Residing at Vernal, Utah

day

of

EXHIBIT E

SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Defendant
LITTLEPIELD fc PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
VICKEY L. BAKE now known
VICKEY L. ADDERLEY,

MOTION TO HAVE COURT REOPEN
JUDGMENT AND DIRECT ENTRY OF A
NEW JUDGMENT, AND FOR A STAY
OF PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
NEAL F. BAKE,

Civil No. 85-CV-137D
(Judge Dennis Draney)

Defendant.
ooOoo

Defendant Neal F. Bake by and through counsel moves this
Court pursuant to Rules 59 and 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, for an Order to Reopen the Judgment in this matter for
the purpose of taking additional testimony relating to the issue
of custody of the minor child of the parties, and to direct entry
of a new judgment. Plaintiff further moves this Court to stay
proceedings to enforce the Judgment altering custody in this
action.
Defendant requests that this Court reopen the Judgment
for the purpose of obtaining a custody evaluation as recommended
by Domestic Relations Commissioner Howard Maetani to be conducted
to determine the best interests of the minor children regarding a
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change of custody and to evaluate the fitness and appropriateness
of the parties requesting custody. Such an evaluation was not
obtained by the parties because of their financial limitations
and the Court denied Defendant's Motion to Direct the Division of
Family Services to conduct such an evaluation.
Furthermore, Defendant respectfully submits that the
decision of the Court in this matter was not supported by the
evidence and was contrary to law. The Court made no finding of
changed circumstances which is a precondition to modifying a
Divorce Decree. It is well settled that before a Divorce Decree
can be modified to change custody, a showing of "substantial
material" change of circumstances must be made. In the absence of
such a showing the Utah Supreme Court has held a petition to
modify custody must be dismissed. Hogge v. Hogge 649 P.2d 51
(Utah 1982), and Lord v^ Shaw 682 P.2d 853 (Utah 1987).
Furthermore, the Court erred in not setting forth particularized findings as to why it would be in the best interests
of the minor children herein to change custody from Defendant's
care to the Plaintiff where they have resided with the Defendant
for over two years since the Divorce and are bonded to him very
strongly. The requirement for a Court to specify the best
interest of the child in the Findings and Conclusions of Law as
set forth in the following case. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d
38 (Utah 1982) and most recently Smith v. Smith, 43 Ut. Adv. Rpt.
5 (No. 20419, filed 9-30-86).
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Additionally, Defendant has moved this Court to stay the
Judgment transferring custody of the minor children from
Defendant's care to Plaintiff. In suppport of this second request
for a stayf Defendant submits that the Court has erred in not
directing the Division of Family Services to conduct an evaluation; by not requiring Plaintiff to show a change of circumstances before modifying a Decree of Divorce; and by not
finding that it would be in the best interest of the minor
children to have custody changed. Unless a stay of the judgment
transferring custody is granted, the children may suffer irreparable injury in the event this Court's ruling is overturned on
appeal and custody is returned to the Defendant.

The minor

children have resided with the Defendant since August of 1985,
and have a stable, secure home with the Defendant to whom they
are closely bonded, and it would be very disruptive to them to
change schools and be uprooted from their neighborhood and
friends at this time. Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice from a
stay of the Court's ruling as she has exercised visitation with
the minor children since the divorce.
Defendant specifically requests the Court to alter it's
Judgment as regards Paragraph Number 8 of the Ruling where the
Court states Defendant said to Plaintiff "you better get your
boys back". Defendant's Affidavit is attached hereto which specifically denies making this statement or that it was not taken in
the appropriate context.

-3-

These Motions are based upon the pleadings on file, the
testimony introduced at trial and the Affidavit of Defendant submitted herewith.
DATED this j[_ day of February, 1988.

SUZANNE MARELIUS
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to Attorney for the Plaintiff, Mr. Clark B.
Allred, NIELSEN 6 SENIOR, 363 East Main Street, Vernal, Utah,
84078, postage prepaid this ^

day of February, 1988.

25471
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SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081
Attorney for Defendant
LITTLEFIELD 6 PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
VICKEY L. BAKE now known
VICKEY L. ADDERLEY,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

v.

)

NEAL F. BAKE,

)
)
)

Defendant.

AFFIDAVIT OF NEAL F. BAKE

Civil No. 85-CV-137D
(Judge Dennis Draney)

ooOoo
COMES NOW Neal F. Bake who upon his oath deposes and
says:
1. I am the Defendant in the above-captioned matter and
was given custody of my sons when I was divorced from Plaintiff
in August of 1985.
2. Plaintiff's petition to modify the Decree of Divorce
and obtain custody was tried on January 19 and 21, 1988. At that
time the Court ruled that the Plaintiff should have custody of
our sons Nathan H. Bake, age 13 and Kyle Bake, age 11.
3. My sons have lived with me ever since the divorce in
August 1985, and the Plaintiff has had visitation. The divorce
was settled by a Stipulation between myself and the Plaintiff
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where she agreed that I should have custody. That Decree also
states that if the children change their mind and express a
desire to live with the Plaintiff then custody will change.
4. Although I am aware that the children have expressed
a desire at times, to live with the Plaintiff, I do not believe
this is in their best interest and believe that a change of
custody would be extremely detrimental to them. I believe that
the main reason they have expressed a desire to live with the
Plaintiff is because they have very little supervision when they
are in her home and they do not have the maturity to make a
reasoned decision on this matter.
5. The Plaintiff lives in a trailer in Roosevelt, Utah,
located behind the "Wave Lounge" (formerly "ID Club").
Plaintiff's employment is as a waitress in the lounge.

The

Plaintiff works from 8:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m., as does her husband who works from 4:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m. in the bar. Thus,
the children are without any supervision after 8:00 p.m. every
night.
6. Since the Divorce two years ago the Plaintiff has
moved at least four times and since the Divorce she has worked
for Pizza Hut and at her present waitressing job. The Wave Lounge
where Plaintiff works is in bankruptcy or foreclosure and it is
thus likely that the employment of both Plaintiff and her husband
there may soon end.

It is thus reasonable to anticipate that the

Plaintiff may again have to move or go out of state as she has

-2-

done before, and that I will have very little access to my sons
if Plaintiff were to have custody.

They will also have less sta-

bility than if they lived with me.
7. I also question the commitment which Plaintiff has to
our sons as her visitation has been sporadic and there have been
gaps of several months with no contact, not even a phone call
or letter, although Plaintiff is entitled to visitation every
weekend. A complete log has been kept of the Plaintiff"s contact with our sons ever since the divorce which shows the
following:
1987

January through May

there were two visits, three
phone calls and one letter
during this time*

1987

April

No contact.

1986

January through June

A total of five visits occurred
one in February, one in March,
one in May and two in June.

1986

April

No contact.

July through December

A total of three visits
occurred, two of which involved
me taking the boys to visit the
Plaintiff.

September and November

No calls or visits.

December

A card was received.

September through
December

A total of four visits plus
Thanksgiving was spent with
the Plaintiff.

1985

8. During the two years I have had custody I have frequently facilitated visitation between the boys and the Plaintiff
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by driving them to Roosevelt, Utah, from my home in Sandy. I have
always resided at the same location and Plaintiff has always had
my address and phone number. There have also been several
occasions where visitation has been scheduled and either cancelled by the Plaintiff or forgotten by her.
9. In addition, I am extremely concerned about the care
Kyle and Nathan have received while with the Plaintiff. The
following are some examples of her poor care of the boys while in
her custody.
December 29, 1985: The boys were returned to my home at
10:00 a.m., without having had breakfast;
June 27, 1986: I picked up the boys from Plaintiff at
7:00 p.m. and they had not been fed dinner; in fact, they are
usually never fed when I picked them up at 7:00 p.m.
August 1987: During visitation my youngest son was
allowed to play with a knife and cut himself and was required to
have stitches.

My son Kyle has asthma which normally does not affect
him unless under emotional strees. The only episodes of asthma
attacks he has had since the divorce have been while in
Plaintiff's care. Most recently, this occurred while Kyle was
with Plaintiff on December 30 and he was hospitalized.
Additionally, the Plaintiff did not, inform me of this hospitalization and I fear she will continue to hide information concerning my son's welfare if she has custody.
10.

My nephew Steven, who is in Plaintiff's full time

care has not had his needs adequately met.
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For example, he is

underweight in my opinion and there have been several referrals
by the Division of Family Services regarding his neglect. Steven
also has very bad teeth and Plaintiff has not given him adequate
dental care. I am obviously extremely concerned about the quality
of care that Nathan and Kyle would receive from the Plaintiff if
custody were changed. Also, when mye boys have returned from
visitation their behaviour is very different then when they are
living with me, as they are more disobedient and unruly.

I

believe this is because they have little supervision when they
are with Plaintiff, and no supervision after 8:00 p.m. at night
and I know they are allowed to stay up as long as they wish.
11. The Court's ruling, at paragraph 8, quotes a statement which I do not believe I made, reporting that I said to the
Plaintiff "you had better get your boys back". I have no
recollection of making this statement and do not believe I did.
Rather, I do recall telling Plaintiff that she should "straighten
up her act" if she ever wanted to regain custody of the boys. At
no time did I suggest to her that I did not want to be the caretaker for the boys, rather, I have discussed with her the
problems concerning her lifestyle and care of the boys which I
believe is harmful to them.
12. I have a very strong sense of family ties and have
made the effort to keep the children in touch through visits and
calls with the Plaintiff's parents. The Plaintiff, has not maintained ties with her parents or extended family. The Plaintiff

-5-

has also denied me visitation and telephone contact with my
nephew Steven who is in Plaintiff's exclusive care. I had to
obtain a Court Order to get rights to visit and call Steven. I
fear that if Plaintiff were to have custody of Nathan and Kyle
that Plaintiff would again deny me access to my sons and also
deny the access of my family with whom she does not like, and may
even move out of state as she has done in the past. I believe it
would be quite detrimental to my sons to have their family relationships undermined in this way.
DATED this *zT

day of February, 1988.

&*<

J^^cS^

NEAL\F. BAKE
Defendant
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s
February,

gP^ay

of

1988.
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NOTARY PUBLIC C s~

Residing a t :
My Commission Expires:
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